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STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THE
DISTRACTION OF “SCIENTIFIC PROOF”
Terence G. Ison*
The related topics of statistical significance and the distraction of
“scientific proof” are sometimes critical to an understanding of expert
evidence. This article relates primarily to the causes of disability and death
in the context of claims for damages, workers’ compensation, motorvehicle insurance benefits, disability insurance, claims under some other
types of insurance, and military pensions for disabilities and deaths
resulting from military service. This article can also be relevant in Charter
cases,1 and in criminal proceedings, though comments on the burden and
standard of proof would need to be modified for that context. It can also be
relevant to academic research, public policy choices, and the roles of
business corporations, universities, and professional bodies.
La signification statistique et la « preuve scientifique » sont des sujets liés
qui sont parfois essentiels à la compréhension de la preuve d’un expert. Le
présent article porte principalement sur les causes de l’invalidité et du
décès dans le cadre de demandes visant à obtenir des dommages-intérêts;
d’indemnisation des accidentés du travail; d’indemnité d’assurance
automobile; d’assurance-invalidité; de demandes découlant d’autres types
d’assurance et de pensions pour invalidité et décès résultant du service
militaire. L’article peut également s’avérer pertinent dans le cadre
d’affaires fondées sur la Charte et de poursuites criminelles; toutefois, il
faudrait modifier les propos sur le fardeau de la preuve et la norme de
preuve dans de tels contextes. L’article peut aussi s’avérer utile pour ce qui
est de la recherche théorique, du choix de politiques publiques et du rôle
des sociétés par actions, des universités et des associations
professionnelles.

*

LL.D; Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School; Barrister & Solicitor. For
very helpful comments on the draft of this article, I am most grateful to Mr. Justice C.
Hinkson of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (formerly a defence counsel in medical
malpractice claims); Professor L. Francescutti, M.D., member of the Department of Public
Health Sciences at the University of Alberta (specializing in safety), and occasional expert
witness; and Dr. R. M. Preshaw, surgeon and occasional expert witness.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [Charter]. The relevance of
this discussion would probably arise on an issue of justification under s. 1 of the Charter,
or equality under s. 15.
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1. Introduction
Previous articles on the significance of “statistical significance” have
generally been written in the context of another discipline, they reflect
experience in that discipline, and are written in the language of that
discipline.2 This article focuses primarily on the context of legal decisionmaking. It is intended to show some of the cautions that are needed when
the literature of other disciplines relating to statistics or “scientific proof”
becomes a component of expert evidence. It is not a synthesis of case-law,
nor does it present a theme. Like the research projects of the author, this
article reflects the view that how legal systems work, the influences upon
them, and the significance of structural and procedural choices, are at least
as important as legal doctrine or theory.
The article draws on over four decades of scholarship, including
fifteen empirical research projects (in Canada and overseas), augmented by
practical experience.3 The academic research and practical experience
have included surveys, attendances at places of treatment and other
fieldwork, reading case files, reading court and tribunal decisions as well
as other legal and medical literature, attending conferences, and
discussions with medical and para-medical personnel and practising
lawyers. Because this article draws primarily on multiple sources from that
long-term experience, the citation of sources is limited to points that are
based on a particular published source. The word “physician” is used
broadly to include a surgeon or other specialist, as well as a general
practitioner.
2. Statistical Significance
a) Meanings
A common meaning of “statistical significance” is that the difference in the
numbers between two groups, read in conjunction with the total numbers,
is wide enough to discount the possibility that the difference may have
resulted from chance. That definition, or some variation of it, is the
common meaning of “statistical significance” when that term is used by
2

See e.g. Ronald P. Carver, “The Case Against Statistical Significance Testing”
(1978) 48 Harvard Educational Review 378; Frank L. Schmidt, “Statistical Significance
Testing and Cumulative Knowledge in Psychology: Implications for Training of
Researchers” (1996) 1 Psychological Methods 115.
3
This experience has included adjudication (mainly as Chairman of the Workers’
Compensation Board (WCB) in British Columbia (BC)), administration, providing expert
evidence to courts and public enquiries, appointments as an arbitrator, opinions for
government agencies and other lawyers, and advocacy as counsel in court proceedings.
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statisticians or scientists. This article does not elaborate on that definition
because, for reasons explained below, this confined meaning is seldom
relevant in legal decisions. One reason for this is that “statistical
significance” refers to only one component of statistical significance — the
chance aspect. Seeing that as the exclusive meaning reflects a perception
of statistics as simply a branch of applied mathematics. That confined
meaning excludes other important components of statistical significance
such as:
• validity of the source data; including
- factual accuracy,
- completeness, and
- comparability;
• impression accuracy – whether the data tends to create a false
impression, having regard to the choices of which data to record,
and which are left unrecorded;
• descriptive accuracy – for example, whether the heading on a
statistical table correctly describes the statistics in the table;
• relevance of the data to the purpose for which they are being used
– for example, whether the medical issue to be decided relates to
negligence, etiology, treatment, prognosis, or the nature and
gravity of any residual disability.
When “statistical significance,” in the more confined sense, is
discussed in the context of particular data, the discussion is commonly
irrelevant because the source data are invalid or at best of no known
validity. Moreover, there is probably an inverse relationship between
“statistical significance” and the validity of data. For example, if a
scholarly physician undertakes a study by converting her patient
information into anonymous data, the resulting statistics may well be valid,
but the numbers too small to be “statistically significant.” If a research
scholar or team undertakes a massive project to obtain data about a vast
number of people, the results may well be “statistically significant;” but if
the validity of the source data was not investigated by fieldwork, the
resulting statistics will probably be invalid. If fieldwork investigation of
the source data was part of the project, there may then be the difficulties
for the scholar of monitoring the validity of data from diverse sources,
including the difficulties of selecting, training and supervising a large staff.
These problems can sometimes make the resulting statistics invalid, or at
least of no known validity.
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When an expert opinion uses statistics, but with no mention of any
uncertainties, problems or qualifications relating to the data, that might be
professional misconduct, depending on the circumstances.4
b) Causes of Death as an Example of the Problems
Mortality statistics were chosen as the prime example for this article
because they are commonly used in the adjudication of claims for damages
or other types of compensation, as well as in other legal proceedings, and
they are often a basis for expert opinions. Mortality statistics are also
commonly used for decisions on prevention and policy choices. Many
studies, for example some on the effects of occupational or environmental
exposures, and some on the effects of prescription drugs, use official
mortality data. Because of the frequent use and importance of mortality
statistics, the tedious detail in some paragraphs under this sub-heading is
necessary to explain what is required for a lawyer or adjudicator to
estimate the validity of the data, and the cogency of any expert opinion that
has a statistical basis.
A basic limitation on the usefulness of mortality statistics in legal
claims, and in public policy, is that the system for gathering and presenting
the data focuses only on the medical causes of death, and confines the
recorded data to those causes. The result is statistical tables showing only
physiological causes of death. Some statistics are produced on the nonmedical causes of death – for example, the police produce statistics on the
causes of road traffic accidents – but statistics on the non-medical causes
are only produced for a small minority of deaths.
A common assumption is that if statistics are published by Statistics
Canada, or another government agency, the validity of the data must have
been checked. That assumption is not easily displaced by the literature
showing it not to be so.5 The checks made by Statistics Canada do not
include fieldwork investigations at the multitude of original source
locations (mostly hospitals, doctors offices, and in some jurisdictions,
coroners offices) and processing locations to investigate by sample the
validity (accuracy, completeness and comparability) of the data received.
If a study gathers its own data by empirical research, the same objections
would apply unless the study includes a good fieldwork program to verify
the validity of the source data, and a monitoring of the coding.
4

General Medical Council v. Meadow et. al., [2006] EWCA Civ. 1390, [2007] 2
WLR 286 [Meadow].
5
Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics – Death Databases: Detailed information for
2005, online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=
getSurvey&SDDS=3233&lang=en&db=IMDB&dbg=f&adm=8&dis=2>.
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One would expect mortality data to be mostly valid with regard to
basic facts, such as numbers of deaths, age at time of death, and place of
death, but it would be unrealistic to expect mortality data to be valid with
regard to judgmental variables, such as causes of deaths. Thus a study
would probably be using valid mortality data if it only uses numbers of
deaths among various categories of people. The portion of mortality data
commonly used in adjudication, in expert evidence, and in journal articles,
however, relates to the causes of death, even though that portion of
mortality data is of unknown validity. The lack of validity confirmation
may be one reason why the courts are sometimes sceptical about opinions
based on statistics.
Our mortality data recording system is based on the “International
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems” produced by the
World Health Organization (WHO).6 That classification is used by
Statistics Canada (and other governments) to produce national mortality
statistics. The data for mortality statistics are obtained from the vital
statistics offices of the provinces, and from the three territories. The vital
statistics offices produce their figures from the medical certificates of
death, which are usually completed by the physician who last attended the
deceased prior to the death, but sometimes by a pathologist or a coroner.7
There is a cut-off date for corrections to be made in the recorded
tabulations.
The standard form of the medical certificate of death8 also shows why
mortality statistics are bound to be invalid in relation to causes of death;
they are incomplete and lack comparability. The first space asks for “the
immediate cause of death.”9 The singular is used (in contrast to the plural
elsewhere) and there is a space for only one answer. Yet many deaths result
from what a lay person might call “old age.” A physician might be able to
identify multiple concurrent causes. If one of them was a triggering event,
that might be called “the immediate cause,” but if there was no triggering
event, it is hard to see how, except by arbitrary choice, one out of several
6

World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision (2007), online: World Health Organization
<http://www.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10 online/>.
7
See e.g. British Columbia, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Resource Manual
for Physicians: Death Certificates, online: College of Physicians and Surgeons of British
Columbia <https://www.cpsbc.ca/cps/physician_resources /publications/resource_manual/
deathcertificates>; British Columbia, Vital Statistics Agency, Medical Certificate of Death
Form (Victoria: Vital Statistics Agency Medical Coding Unit).
8
The form referred to here is the one issued by the Vital Statistics Agency of
British Columbia. Other jurisdictions use a form that is similar, but not identical.
9
Ibid.
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concurrent causes could be selected as “the immediate cause.” When one
of the concurrent causes is selected, regardless of how that is done, the
other concurrent causes might be omitted.
The next question asks for “Antecedent causes, if any, giving rise to
the immediate cause (a) above, stating the underlying causes last.”10 There
are spaces for three answers; but there is nothing to indicate whether the
certifying physician considered the last antecedent cause to be
“underlying,” the last two, all three or none of them. The form contains no
definition of “antecedent,” but since the question follows the one about the
immediate cause, this seems to imply that an antecedent cause must
precede the immediate cause. It cannot be another concurrent cause. But
suppose, for example, the deceased contracted a disease ten years ago. It
gradually worsened until it became a contributing cause of death. It was an
antecedent disease, but since it was current and contributory at the time of
death, it would not appear to be an antecedent cause of death. This is one
example of how the questions in the form deal with multiple consecutive
causes (a chain of events), but not multiple concurrent causes.
It is also unclear how much time should elapse between two events to
classify one as antecedent and the other as immediate. For example, if a
traumatic event that happened ten years ago was a cause of death, it should
obviously be classified as antecedent. The appropriate classification is less
obvious if the traumatic event occurred the day before death.
It would be unrealistic to assume that in respect of any death, all
physicians would classify the same cause as antecedent or immediate.
Heart attacks can illustrate the point. Suppose a car drives off the road and
rolls over. The driver is found dead. A pathologist or other physician finds
only minor traumatic injuries, and concludes that the driver died of a heart
attack. If no other evidence is available, however, it could be unrealistic to
expect the physician to express a professional opinion on whether the heart
attack caused the car to drive off the road — in which case the traffic
accident might not have been causative at all — or the fright of the car
going off the road triggered the heart attack. The selection for statistical
purposes of traffic accident as the underlying cause of death, or a health
condition underlying the heart attack, could be an arbitrary choice, rather
than a professional judgment.
In the portion of the form used for the published mortality statistics,
the last question asks for “Other significant conditions contributing to the
death but not resulting in the underlying cause...”11 The singular here in
10
11

Ibid. [emphasis added].
Ibid.
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relation to an underlying cause is incompatible with the plural used in the
previous question. Having regard to the two previous questions, this one
has no clear meaning, and it is surely unrealistic to believe that all
physicians will understand the question to mean the same thing.
The definition of “underlying cause” published by the WHO is “the
disease or injury which initiated the train of morbid events leading directly
to death, or the circumstances of the accident or violence which produced
the fatal injury.”12 That definition raises more questions than it answers.
With regard to traumatic deaths, for example, that definition seems to refer
to immediate causes, rather than any underlying cause. With regard to
deaths from disease, that definition assumes that all such deaths result from
multiple consecutive causes and none from multiple concurrent causes.
Suicides illustrate the point. If a certifying physician follows the WHO
definition of “underlying cause,” read in light of the WHO classification
system, a medical certificate of death might show “gunshot wound” as the
“immediate cause” of death, and “suicide” as the “antecedent cause”,
which will be coded as the “underlying cause.” That would seem like
splitting hairs. For mortality statistics to be relevant in legal claims, as well
as for public policy decisions and medical services, one might well see
suicide as the immediate cause, and the events or circumstances creating
the suicidal state of mind as the underlying cause.
Since the word “underlying” is not defined in the certificate form, it
would also be unrealistic to expect all physicians to remember the WHO
definition when completing a certificate, or to all understand this word to
mean the same thing in all circumstances. One might also think that the
underlying causes of a death could include background decisions, such as:
• a policy or administrative decision of government;
• a decision of a business corporation relating to purchasing,
production or marketing; or
• a decision of the deceased, perhaps relating to hobbies,
recreation or diet.
Such underlying causes of death never seem to appear in mortality
statistics, but they are probably the most relevant for public policy
decisions, and can be the most relevant in legal advice and claims
adjudication.

12

World Health Organization, About the WHO Mortality Data, online: World
Health Organization <http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/mortdata /en/index.html>.
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Vital statistics offices use a software program to convert the
information from medical certificates of death into the international
classification. This can help to achieve a consistency in processing, but it
cannot help to achieve accuracy or comparability of the data. As the
information received in the medical certificates of death is coded, the
software program selects one reported cause of death as “the underlying
cause.” An arbitrary rule is generally to treat the last answer on the list of
antecedent causes as the underlying cause, regardless of whether the
certifying physician might have felt that none of the antecedent causes was
underlying, or that all of them were. The published mortality statistics then
show figures for only one cause of a death; and that is the one coded in the
vital statistics offices as the “underlying cause.” The answers in the
certificates that are not used to supply data to Statistics Canada for
publication are not otherwise published. They may, however, be used to
supply statistics to order.
In some cases, usually accident cases, a physician may be able to
contribute fewer thoughts on the cause of death than could a lay witness.
For example, suppose a construction worker is killed by falling eight
metres from a scaffold, landing on concrete. One might expect a physician
to report the fall as the “immediate cause” of death. Perhaps the physician
might also be able to determine if the deceased had a health problem that
was likely to have impaired his balance, and therefore be an antecedent
cause. But if the physician finds no physiological cause of the fall, what
could be certified as an “underlying cause,” distinct from the “immediate
cause?” Witnesses of the accident might see the underlying cause as an
exceptional gust of strong wind, the unnecessary use of scaffolding,
instability of the scaffold due to the omission of structural features, the
platform being too narrow, lack of guard rails, failure of the employer to
provide fall-prevention equipment, failure of the deceased to use the
equipment provided, or failure of a government agency to enforce safety
regulations.
In that example, when a medical certificate of death is coded by the
software program for conversion into statistics, the “underlying cause” of
death would probably be recorded as a “Non-motor-vehicle accident.” But
for most purposes, the underlying causes as seen by witnesses of the fall
would probably be more useful to know. The non-medical causes of death
might be determined by a health and safety inspector, or by a coroner; but
their determinations could depend on such variables as whether the site had
been changed before it was inspected, which witnesses are willing to
provide evidence, and what conflicts of interest might underlie witness
statements. For these reasons, it may not be feasible to determine the nonmedical causes in each case and record the answers for mortality statistics,
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even if the system provided for that to be done. There is the added
difficulty of achieving comparability when the data being recorded are
judgmental. Such explanations of why it is not done do not detract,
however, from the point that the official mortality data can sometimes be
a distraction from the information that would be more useful for preventive
purposes, as well as for a damages claim (if still available in the particular
situation), and for the consideration of criminal or other sanctions.
There are subsequent questions on the certificate of death form,
including “Environmental/occupational/lifestyle (e.g. pesticides, asbestos,
abuse of tobacco, alcohol, etc.)” with a small space for a single answer.13
These possible causes of death do not appear in the parts of the certificate
dealing with the immediate, antecedent, underlying or other significant
causes. So the answers to this question do not form part of the published
mortality statistics. Even if the answers to this question were published, a
certifying physician will commonly have no knowledge of causative
exposures, and if they are not mentioned in the available medical file, it
would be unrealistic to expect any physician to make the enquiries that
would be necessary to respond to that question. Even for a living patient,
it is not usual for a physician to take an environmental history, an
occupational history, an employment history,14 or other exposure history.
Questions about a possible exposure might be raised by a physician or by
a patient, and it might sometimes be possible to find an answer, but nobody
tries to maintain a historical record of all exposures; and even if anyone
tried, the resulting record would only be a tiny fraction of actual exposures.
This problem is common for diseases with a long latency period. An
employer might maintain a record of in-plant pollution, but that record will
commonly be based on measurements of a particular contaminant at
particular sampling points. It might be useful as an indicator of
possibilities, but it will not provide a record of all the exposures of a
particular worker. Even as a record of exposure of a particular worker to
the contaminant that was being measured, it may be less accurate than
personal recollection if no regular sample was collected at the work-station
of that worker.
For accidents, the medical certificate of death form includes the
question “How did the accident occur? (describe circumstances).”15 This
suggests that the answer should not be purely medical; but unless the
certifying physician was a witness, the answer will consist of hearsay,
13

See e.g. form cited at supra note 7.
A disease may result from a worker’s occupation, but it may result from aspects
of the worker’s employment, or the industry, that are unrelated to that worker’s particular
occupation.
15 See e.g. form cited at supra note 7.
14
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possibly even second-hand hearsay, and may depend on nothing more than
the coincidence of which witness remained available to speak to the
physician. In the exceptional cases in which the certificate is completed by
a coroner following an inquest, the answers are likely to be more reliable,
but they would still be judgmental. For that reason, the answers may still
be of questionable significance as a base for statistical data on the causes
of death. In any event, the answers to this question do not become part of
the published mortality statistics.
There are also other validity problems. For example, if taking a
prescription drug for five years caused a driver’s vision to decline,
resulting in a traffic accident that killed a pedestrian, that death would
probably appear in mortality statistics as resulting from a traffic accident.
It may be less likely to appear as resulting from the drug, or from the
condition being treated by the drug. Another example of multiple
consecutive etiology might be a patient who is in hospital for surgery
required by prostate or breast cancer. The patient contracts an infection
while there, and dies from the infection. That death may appear in the
mortality statistics as caused by the infection. It may be less likely to
appear as being caused by cancer, or the causes of the cancer. It is even less
likely to be attributed to government cuts in the funds to maintain hospital
hygiene standards, even if it is the opinion of the certifying physician that
this was the underlying cause of death.
Other problems relate to deaths from multiple concurrent causes, such
as several infections, cancers, or other deteriorations of several organs.
Where a patient was suffering from a variety of conditions at the time of
death, it is commonly beyond the capacity of medical science, or beyond
the time available to the certifying physician, to determine which among
those conditions were contributing causes of the death. It is also unrealistic
to assume that there will be a consistency among all physicians about how
multiple successive or concurrent contributing causes will be identified
and recorded. Related to this, while it is reasonable to expect a physician
to allocate the time to identify the causes of a condition in a living patient,
where etiology may be relevant to treatment and to prevention, it would be
unrealistic to expect a physician to allocate the same time if identification
of the causes of death is seen as needed only for statistics.
The problems of multiple concurrent causes are mitigated, though not
solved, by grouping some concurrent causes into a single cause, and
recording that group as one underlying cause in the statistics. For example,
if a person died of cancer in several organs, the “underlying cause” of
death would probably appear in the mortality statistics as “neoplasms,”
whether the cancers had a common etiology, or separate etiologies.
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It would also be unrealistic to assume that all physicians are equally
conscientious in completing a medical certificate of death, or that all
physicians are equally capable, or even that the same physician is equally
good at diagnosing every type of condition and assessing its causative
significance in relation to death. One would also expect variations in the
levels of precision or generality with which conditions are described.
These are some of the many problems of validity when statistics are
attempted for judgmental variables.
Another limitation of mortality data can be the difficulty of deciding
whether a vulnerability was also a cause of death. Suppose someone died
of an infection causing a disease. The deceased had been on a drug. The
certifying physician believes that the drug would have caused a rise in
acidic levels in the body, and that this probably made the deceased
vulnerable to the disease. If most people contracting the same disease do
not have that vulnerability, however, it could be a rare case in which the
physician could then record an opinion on whether the vulnerability was a
cause of the particular death.
Related to the problems mentioned above is the question of whether
all physicians would be using the same standard of proof in identifying
causes of death. The certificate form does not say whether a cause should
be noted if it was possible, or if it was probable, or only if it was close to
a certainty.
Guidelines are available for completing a medical certificate of
death;16 but even if all physicians could always remember what they say,
the guidelines do not provide answers to most of the questions and
problems mentioned above, and in some ways, they aggravate the
problems. For example, the guidelines state that when certifying the causes
of death “... any disease, abnormality, injury, or poisoning, believed to have
adversely affected the decedent should be reported...”17 Suppose a
certifying physician believes that the deceased was adversely affected by a
leg amputation that occurred ten years before the death. The guidelines, if
read to mean what they say, provide that this should be reported as a cause
of death, even if the certifying physician believes that it had no causative
significance at all.

16

See e.g. Nova Scotia, Vital Statistics, A Handbook for Physicians and Medical
Examiners: Medical Certification of Death and Stillbirth (Halifax, NS.: Service Nova
Scotia and Municipal Relations Registry and Information Management Services Vital
Statistics, 2000), online: Nova Scotia Vital Statistics <http://www.gov.ns.ca/snsmr/
vstat/pdf/Physicians_Handbook.pdf>.
17 Ibid. at 10.
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Completing a medical certificate of death can also involve conflicts of
interest. For the certifying physician, some attributions of cause might
create the risk of a lawsuit, disciplinary action, collegial displeasure,
expressions of outrage, or powerful lobbying. Other attributions of cause
might not create such a risk.
The broadest classifications of causes of death might seem reliable.
For example, the tables produced by Statistics Canada classify deaths as
resulting from accidents, suicides, or disease. At first impression, those
classifications seem simple, but it is unrecorded how many of the accidents
or suicides were caused by disease, or how many diseases or suicides were
a subsequent consequence of accidents. The problems mentioned above
also illustrate that questions about causes of death are too judgmental to
assume that the answers are comparable. When the answers are used for
statistics, comparability is an element of validity. This is one reason why
statistics on the causes of death are of no known validity.
As well as the validity problems of mortality statistics, there is often a
dilemma about whether the mortality data used in any study should be
accompanied by morbidity data (ill-health data). This dilemma can arise
whether a study uses official statistics or numbers produced by empirical
research. The dilemma can arise, for example, in a study on the effects of
drugs, nutrients or foods, or occupational or environmental exposures. If,
as commonly happens, mortality statistics are used without morbidity
statistics, any health consequences of a drug, nutrient, food or exposure
might be underestimated, creating a false impression. If morbidity statistics
are also used, however, that creates another range of problems. One is the
more limited availability of morbidity data. Another is that the validity
problems of data on the causes of morbidity are even greater than those on
the causes of death.
The problems mentioned above can explain the abusive language
sometimes used about statistics, such as the classic phrase “lies, damned
lies and statistics,” but such language does not prevent the continuing use
of statistics of unknown validity.
c) Impression Accuracy
Even if statistics are valid (including factual accuracy, completeness, and
comparability) their publication can still give a false impression. Statistics
on the causes of occupational disabilities and deaths illustrate the point;
showing how a false impression can result from decisions to produce
certain statistics, but not others. In From Awareness to Action:
WorkSafeBC Statistics 2005, the Workers’ Compensation Board of British
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Columbia produced a table similar to that produced annually in B.C. and
in other jurisdictions.18 Table B-1 includes the following information:

This table, unaccompanied by others, can leave the impression that
most occupational disabilities and deaths are simply caused by behaviour
at the time of the event, usually worker behaviour. No table is produced of
the disabilities and deaths caused by employers’ decisions such as
decisions relating to the location and design of plant; choice of machinery,
product, components or materials used; ergonomics; selection and training
of workers; or financial incentives to management or workers. An added
importance of employers’ decisions is that employers can, to a large extent,
determine the decisions and behaviour of workers; but workers have no
corresponding power over the decisions of employers.
Similarly, no table is produced of the disabilities and deaths caused by
decisions of governments, or government departments or agencies, such as
decisions relating to trade, transport or subsidies.
The bulk of accidents probably result from some combination of
contributing causes, such as the situation in which the accident occurred,
earlier decisions creating that context (such as design or equipment
18 British Columbia: WorkSafeBC Annual Report Publications, 2005, online:
<http://www.worksafebc.com/publications/reports/statistics_reports/assets/pdf/stats2005.
pdf>; the Workers’ Compensation Board is the Board’s statutory title, though the Board
now calls itself by the exhortation “WorkSafeBC.”
19 Ibid. at 40. Table B-1 has been edited to omit the breakdowns by type of industry.
The percentage column has also been added; the error of 1 in the total is in the original.

132

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol.87

choices), behaviour at the time of the event, factors inducing that
behaviour, unexpected hazards (such as a premature equipment failure), or
natural phenomena.20
The published tables on immediate activities as causes of disability
and death can be useful if treated cautiously. But they have a superficial
appearance of recording basic non-judgmental facts, and when not
accompanied by other statistics on causation, they tend to create the false
impression that most accidents in the course of employment result,
primarily or solely, from worker behaviour. It would logically follow that
preventive measures should focus primarily on worker behaviour.
Preventive action may then not be taken, or sanctions applied, in respect of
the critical underlying causes. These may be the causes that are more
amenable to prevention. Such statistics can also distract from any
consideration of when actions for damages might lie.21
Of course there are explanations for the choice of what statistics to
produce. Data about what happened at the time of injury can easily be
produced from the standard reports received by workers’ compensation
boards from employers, workers and attending physicians. Data about
underlying causes of disabilities and deaths, the decisions of employers,
third parties and governments, could only be produced by careful
investigation in each case, or by research projects. Also, data relating only
to physical acts are not subject to as many validity problems as data
relating to more judgmental variables. These explanations do not, however,
impair the point that the table gives an incomplete picture, and a false
impression.
The differences between statistics, such as those in the table shown
above, and more complete evidence of the causes of disabilities and deaths,
illustrate some of the difficulties of using statistics in adjudication, or for
making other decisions. Invalid or misleading statistics, however,
commonly are used (by expert witnesses or otherwise) in adjudication, as
well as for making policy decisions. An aggravating factor is the old adage
that the person who decides what statistics to record plays a key role in
policy-making. It could be added that sometimes such a person also plays
20

Summaries of contemporary studies (Canadian and foreign) of the causes of
occupational accidents and diseases can be found in the weekly OHS Canada email
newsletter. OHS Canada is a Canadian occupational health and safety online and print
news-service published by the Business Information Group, division of Hollinger Canadian
Newspapers, Toronto, online: OHS Canada, <http://www.ohscanada.com/>.
21 In Canada, damages might usually be claimed against a person who was neither
a worker nor an employer, or at least, not in the jurisdiction in which the disabled or
deceased worker was employed.
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a key role in the formation of medical opinions and in adjudication. Those
roles are not widely recognized.
Financial figures published by government give a similar false
impression. A classic example is the GDP (Gross Domestic Product). The
total market value of goods produced and services rendered is estimated
and published. The media usually portray an increase in the GDP as good.
But the GDP makes no set-off for the cost of disabilities, deaths and other
damaging human consequences of the production and distribution of
goods, or the provision of services. Moreover, if tax revenues are spent to
remedy any damage caused by production, for example, on the removal of
polluted soil, that expenditure is added to the GDP, instead of being
deducted. An estimate of the net domestic product would be far more
useful for making policy decisions in the public interest, as well as for
other purposes.
d) Relevance
As one aspect of relevance, the courts require that opinions be received
only from those who are qualified to express them. There is no such
requirement with regard to opinions on public policy. Public opinion polls
illustrate the concern. A poll can be relevant and useful on a question that
depends on the experience of the respondents. For example, a poll showing
that the bulk of people in Canada thought that telemarketing should be
prohibited would be informative. Most of the respondents would at least
know the significance of telemarketing for themselves. However, many
polls taken by or for the media, or an interest group, ask questions when
the respondents are unlikely to know the significance of the answers. A
recent example was a “news” report of a poll asking whether judges should
be elected.22 The poll reported 63 percent of respondents in favour. The
poll was not reported to have been among people who had read some of
the studies on the significance of judges being elected or appointed. Data
produced by such simplistic polls distract from rational thought, and they
distract from public policy decisions, or adjudicative decisions, being
made on a rational basis.
e) Explanations for the Widespread Use of Invalid Statistics
There are several possible explanations why most of the statistics that are
published or otherwise used are based on data that are invalid, or of
unknown validity, or that give a false impression.

22

Kirk Makin,“Two-thirds Back Electing Judges” The Globe and Mail (9 April
2007) A1.
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1) Background of Statisticians
Statisticians commonly have a strong mathematical background, and a
consequential expertise in statistical analysis. They usually have no
comparable background in, or aptitude for, the techniques of investigating
the accuracy, completeness and comparability of data at their original
source locations.
2) Conflict of Interest
Statisticians have a conflict of interest. If the statistics published and used
were confined to those that are checked by fieldwork investigation to
ensure the validity of the source data, and that do not give a false
impression, the work available for statisticians would be a small fraction
of what it now is.
3) Illusion of Accuracy Created by Statistics
For some expert witnesses and other authors, using statistics can create an
image of scientific professionalism, however illusory that image may be.
It is common for scientists to disparage the use of anecdotal evidence. For
all of the above reasons, however, in any study that depends on the causes
of death or ill-health, a scholarly survey of anecdotal evidence can be more
scientific than the use of official mortality or morbidity statistics.
Medical research has also proved that anecdotal evidence and
empirical research are often far more valid than official statistics on
mortality or morbidity. Asbestos-related diseases may be the best example
of the point. Following the widespread use of asbestos, decades went by
during which no volume of deaths or disabilities were being attributed to
its production or use. Eventually, it was proved by epidemiological
research23 that there was a large and continuing volume of deaths and
disabilities resulting from asbestos-related diseases, including asbestosis,
mesothelioma, and a portion of lung and other cancers. That research also
proved that during the preceding decades, the anecdotal evidence,24 the
“unscientific” views of many general practitioners, and the opinions of
industrial workers,25 had all been more accurate than official mortality or

23

Particularly the many research projects of Dr. Irving J. Selikoff in 1968 and
subsequent years. These studies are also a good example of how a sound methodology to
assure the validity of the source data far outweighed the importance of sample size.
24 Including that from the early twentieth century.
25 Including many in the ship-building industry, and the asbestos miners of Quebec
involved in the strike of 1949.
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morbidity statistics, and more accurate than the specialists’ opinions that
mentioned statistics or “scientific proof.”
4) Funding of Statistical Research
For Statistics Canada, its revenues might be maximised by the volume of
its output, rather than the quality. The total cost of fieldwork investigations
to monitor the validity of source data and coding practices could be several
times its present budget. Related to this, it is normal in a budgeting process
to focus on the cost of doing something. Commonly, the cost of not doing
it is not even estimated, particularly if that cost will be external to the
institution preparing the budget.
5) Pervasiveness of Numeric Standards
The last 30 years have seen:
• An expansion in the role of accountants beyond their expertise in
accounting, and into the efficiency of administration and
adjudication.
• A contraction in the perception and role of economics, counting
only goals that are numerically measurable, distracting from the
externalization of costs, and degrading non-market values.
• In the universities, a downgrading of the social sciences and
humanities, and a priority for business, technology, and the
natural sciences.
• A resurrection of MBO (Management by Objectives) and its use
in government departments and agencies, regardless of its
negative effects on efficiency, including the production of false
or misleading statistics on costs and output. Also, like the
phenomena just mentioned above, MBO focuses on numeric
goals to the neglect of quality and human impact, and to the
neglect of other goals that are hard to measure numerically. In an
apparent effort to rebut this criticism, invalid surveys are
sometimes used to produce misleading statistics on user
satisfaction.
• Related to the first and fourth of these points, reports by
government auditors demanding the use of bureaucratic
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normalcy by adjudicative bodies;26 overlooking
incompatibility of that with adjudication according to law.

the

These circumstances and developments combine to give misleading
numeric goals a priority over quality and human values. In the process,
they combine to generate invalid and misleading statistics.
6) Illusion that Technology Eliminates Problems
It is sometimes suggested that statistics do not involve the same problems
nowadays as they did, because the evolution of computer-related
technology has achieved a scientific accuracy that avoids the limitations of
human output. This is only true to a limited extent. The colloquial axiom
“garbage in, garbage out” seems unrefined, but it makes a good point. With
regard to statistics, computers can improve the consistency of dataprocessing and increase accuracy of the mathematics; but computers do
not check the validity of the information at source, nor the coding of
diverse verbal information into classifications for the production of
numeric data. Nor can computers ensure that any mathematical formula
applied is relevant. These limitations of computers are critical with regard
to statistics relating to judgmental variables, such as the causes of death or
disability.
f) The Etiology of Disease
Some of the points mentioned above are most cogent in relation to the
etiology of disease. The following limitations also commonly impair the
statistics used in the adjudication of etiological issues.
26

See e.g. Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report on the Workers’
Compensation Board of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut (Ottawa: Communications,
2006) online: Office of the Auditor General http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/
200606wcbce.pdf>. One example of bureaucratic normalcy is that government auditors or
senior administrators commonly require that adjudicators be supervised. These
requirements do not distinguish between constructive types of supervision (such as spot
checks for quality control and the prevention of fraud) and the types of supervision that are
incompatible with quasi-judicial adjudication (such as some decisions on a claim being
made by a supervisor who has not read the file, and who is not the person who has engaged
in oral communication with the parties, representatives and witnesses, and received their
evidence and arguments). Another common requirement of bureaucratic normalcy is annual
budgeting. If anyone suggested that a chief justice should prepare an annual budget,
estimating the total amount of damages to be awarded by the court in the next year, this
would be recognized as absurd, and an improper influence on achieving justice case by
case. It is just as incompatible with the goal of justice according to law when the same
demand is made in a social insurance system.
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1) The Irrelevance of “Statistical Significance”
Some reasons have been explained above why statistics are commonly
insignificant, even when “statistically significant” in the confined meaning
of that term. What can more easily be overlooked by a lawyer, an expert
witness, a judge or other adjudicator, is that the converse is also true.
Occasionally, statistics can be legally relevant and significant as a basis for
a medical opinion, even if the data are not “statistically significant” in the
confined meaning of that term. This is because, as mentioned above,
“statistical significance” is determined by a mathematical formula
designed to discount the possibility that a difference in the numbers
relating to two groups might have occurred by chance. A mathematical
formula designed for that purpose will use a standard of proof much higher
than the balance of probabilities. To require “statistical significance”
would, therefore, be to require a standard of proof much higher than the
standard required in law. However, there is a more compelling and more
broadly applicable reason why “statistical significance” is usually an
irrelevant fine line in adjudication on issues of etiology.
Suppose, for example, the issue is whether disease A was caused by
employment in industry B. Epidemiological research, including medical
examinations, and any adjustments that may be needed to the numbers,
shows that the incidence of disease A is 3 percent higher among workers
in industry B than among other people in the same age range, and who live
in the same area upwind of the industry. An expert witness might explain
that, to be “statistically significant,” the difference would need to be at
least 4 percent. That opinion would have been reached by applying a strict
mathematical formula to the numbers. When the legal standard of proof is
the balance of probabilities, a difference as low as 1 percent would be
sufficient to warrant a conclusion that employment in industry B causes
disease A in some cases, unless that conclusion is contradicted by other
evidence.
If those statistics are the only evidence of etiology, however, the most
common reason why “statistical significance” is irrelevant is that
whichever side of the line the numbers fall, the balance of probabilities
would still warrant a conclusion that the disease was not caused by
employment in the particular case. On the figures mentioned above, the
difference between a “statistically significant” 5 percent, and a
“statistically insignificant” 3 percent, is an irrelevant fine line. If the
difference was 1 percent, 30 percent or 90 percent, the result would be the
same. It would still appear that, on a balance of probabilities, the particular
claimant would have contracted disease A if never employed in industry B.
But this is usually unrelated to “statistical significance.” This is why
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mathematical expertise on exactly how and where the fine line of
“statistical significance” should be drawn is not usually relevant. To be
proof of a claim, the proportion of workers in industry A who contracted
disease B would need to be higher than the proportion in the control group
by at least about 100 percent of the proportion in that group (or in Quebec,
more than 100 percent higher). Of course, the higher the proportion
between 1 percent and 100 percent, the greater the probability that the
employment was causative in the particular case; but this would only
become relevant if the statistics are used in conjunction with other
evidence of employment causation in that case.
Although usually irrelevant when issues of etiology arise in the
context of claims adjudication, “statistical significance” can become
relevant in the context of prevention.
2) Negative Usage
Epidemiological research also has its limitations when used in support of
a negative conclusion:
• It can be relevant to epidemiological studies, as well as to official
statistics, that many of the problems of data validity relate to
omissions. For this reason, validity problems are at their greatest if
the statistics are used in an exclusionary way.
• Epidemiological studies usually focus on one contaminant, one
drug, or one other item of consumption.27 A negative conclusion of
such a study may show nothing persuasive when a claimant has
been exposed to that contaminant, drug, or other item, in
combination with others.
• A negative conclusion of an epidemiological study would not show
whether the particular claimant had an unusual susceptibility to the
particular contaminant, drug or other item (in which case the “thinskull rule” would apply).
3) The Healthy Worker Effect
Sometimes, a negative conclusion on causation is sought or explained by
27

In relation to occupational causes, some epidemiological studies seek to avoid
this problem by focussing on a particular occupation or type of industrial site, rather than a
particular contaminant; see e.g. James T. Brophy et al. “Cancer and Construction: What
Occupational Histories in a Canadian Community Reveal” (2007) 13 Int’l J. Occup.
Environ. Health 32.
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reference to data showing that the incidence of a disease among the
workers in an industry is no higher than among the public at large. That
suggestion assumes that the public is otherwise a comparable group with
the workers in the industry. If the workers have been selected, by the
employer or by themselves, for being particularly healthy, the public at
large is not a comparable group. The statistical comparison is then invalid
unless an adjustment has been made for the healthy worker effect.
g) Conclusions
The gravity of the validity problems mentioned above will vary with any
use made of the statistics, and examples may be found of mortality
statistics being used constructively in the development of medical
knowledge, in public policy decisions, and in the reports of expert
witnesses used in adjudication. Even when statistics are otherwise
relevant, however, “statistical significance,” in the confined meaning of
that term, is only one element in estimating the significance of mortality,
morbidity and other statistics. Similarly in non-medical subjects, empirical
research can often produce more accurate results than published
aggregated data, at least if the empirical research has produced statistics for
which the scholar has done the field-work to investigate the validity of the
source data.
Statistics are commonly used in adjudication, whether by an expert
witness or otherwise, without discussion of the problems of data
validity.28 But medical evidence for a court or other adjudicative body, and
medical advice to government departments and agencies, and to other
organizations, needs to be read with a healthy scepticism if it justifies the
use of statistics by the phrase “statistically significant” when the statistics
are of unknown validity. Moreover, the validity problems do not diminish
only because larger numbers are involved. The confined and misleading
meaning of “statistical significance” is sometimes compounded when that
term is used in the same study or opinion as the phrase “scientific proof.”
With regard to causes of death, many of the validity problems relate to
omissions from the medical certificate of death, and the further omissions
when the data is processed to select only one item from those certificates
for use in the published mortality statistics. For this reason, the validity
problems are at their greatest if the statistics are used in an exclusionary
way, and at their least when the statistics are used in an inclusionary way.

28

For an exception see Meadow, supra note 4.
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3. The Distraction of “Scientific Proof”
a) Meaning
In the context of a medical opinion for adjudication, “scientific proof” of
diagnosis usually refers to whether an opinion is supported by scientific
testing, such as X-rays, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), or laboratory
tests. Where the issue is etiology, “scientific proof” might consist of animal
studies or epidemiological research.
A related and sometimes alternative phrase is “objective medical
evidence.” It is sometimes asserted that an affirmative medical opinion
should be rejected because it is not “objective.” In adversarial proceedings,
“objective” can mean unbiased. But in inquisitorial proceedings29 such as
workers’ compensation, and sometimes in the courts, the two common
meanings of this assertion are:
1. The conclusion in the medical opinion depends on symptoms or
other facts described by the patient to the physician, and which
the physician cannot corroborate; or
2. The conclusion of the opinion is not supported by “scientific
proof.”
When the first meaning is intended, any adjudicator who rejects a
medical opinion because it is not “objective” has made three erroneous
assumptions of law:
· At least with regard to the symptoms of an injury, or other facts
necessary for a medical opinion, evidence of the claimant is
inadmissible (or should be disbelieved) unless it is corroborated;
29 Probably the bulk of adjudicative decisions on claims for disability or death are
made in an inquisitorial system. This is because the bulk of actions for damages are either
settled or abandoned. It was a goal of workers’ compensation, for example, to save disabled
workers and dependants from having to bargain from a position of disadvantage, and
provide them instead with prompt and economical adjudication. In most social insurance
and social security systems, the proceedings are inquisitorial, though it has been normal to
avoid the use of that word, probably because of the traditional hostility of the legal
profession in Canada to inquisitorial proceedings, and its dedication to the adversary
system. This probably explains why, in the Meredith Report that was the basis for our
present systems of workers’ compensation, Chief Justice Meredith was determined to have
an inquisitorial system, even for appeals, and to save disabled workers and dependants from
the bias, injustice and other problems inherent in the adversary system. Yet he never used
the word “inquisitorial” in his report, and workers’ compensation became known as an
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· Any medical opinion that is based on such evidence of the
claimant is inadmissible, or should be discarded; and
· If any question relating to the existence, diagnosis or etiology of
a disability cannot be answered in the affirmative without
evidence from the claimant, that question should be answered in
the negative.
Adopting any of these rules of exclusion is clearly illegal, unless such
a rule is specifically prescribed by statute. It follows that a “medical”
report based only on the lack of “objective” medical evidence is not a
medical opinion at all. It is an erroneous opinion on a question of law, and
therefore inadmissible.
Where the inquisitorial system applies, if symptoms or other facts
described by a claimant to a physician cannot be corroborated by the
physician, and if the credibility of the claimant is doubted, the adjudicator
has a legal duty to resolve that doubt. Usually, an efficient way of doing so
would be for the adjudicator to question the claimant, either by an oral
hearing, or in an informal sit-down discussion with the claimant.30 The
doubt cannot lawfully be resolved by a practice of discarding any medical
opinion if it depends on evidence of the claimant.
Such a rule of exclusion is also incompatible with one of the rationales
for the original establishment of workers’ compensation boards, and some
other social insurance bodies — that adjudicators should admit a broader
range of evidence than would be admissible in the courts. The adoption of
such an exclusionary rule by any board would make it more restrictive than
the courts in the admission of evidence.
Another objection to such an exclusionary rule is that it often defies
common sense. As well as the normal propensity of most people to be
honest, there are cogent incentives for patients to be honest when reporting
symptoms to attending physicians. Patients usually want their physicians
“enquiry system;” see Ontario, Commission of Inquiry into the laws relating to the liability
of employers to make compensation to their employees for injuries received in the course
of their employment which are in force in other countries, and as to how far such laws are
found to work satisfactorily, Final Report, by Hon. Sir William Ralph Meredith C.J.O.
(Toronto: Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1913) [Meredith Report].
30 This was recognized in workers’ compensation when the decentralization of
claims adjudication and administration began in 1974 in BC. The primary reason for that
change was to facilitate a hearing (then called an oral enquiry) by the adjudicator, or an
informal sit-down discussion with the claimant, as well as with an employer, a physician,
or another witness.
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to be well-informed so that they can make the right diagnosis, the best
choice of treatment, and sometimes so that they can give good advice on
rehabilitation. Also, most patients do not know the limitations of medical
science. They do not know when, or to what extent, a physician can tell if
they are speaking the truth. Thus a patient who lied to a treating physician
could be taking the risk of being found out, as well as the risk of being
badly treated. A treating physician who has examined a claimant on several
occasions, perhaps many occasions over many years, is also usually in a
good position to assess the truth of what the patient says.
Sometimes, the medical issue is the existence of a disability, or
whether a disability precludes a return to work. A common example is
chronic pain syndrome. The credibility of the claimant is often further
enhanced in these cases because the truth of what the claimant says puts
the claimant at a financial, as well as social, disadvantage. This commonly
happens because the claimant would receive much less in compensation
than would be received in earnings if the claimant was fit to return to work.
Information from a claimant to a specialist or other physician is more
likely to be questionable when the issue is etiology. Those are the cases in
which a claimant usually has a financial incentive to pursue the claim.
They are, therefore, more likely to be cases in which investigation is
sometimes needed, such as oral questioning of claimants by the
adjudicator, or other enquires.
When the second meaning of “objective” is intended, that word is a
synonym for “scientific proof.”
b) The Problem
If an expert witness in court has not been properly instructed, a negative
opinion is occasionally based on nothing but the lack of “scientific proof”
of the affirmative. The witness is assuming that the absence of “scientific
proof” of the affirmative warrants a presumption of the negative. That is
not a medical opinion. It is an erroneous legal opinion, irrelevant, and
inadmissible. Also, any decision based on such an opinion could, in effect,
be an unwarranted delegation to the witness of the jurisdiction to decide
the general issue. The same problem arises if a negative conclusion is
reached for no reason except that the affirmative medical opinion was not
“objective.”
It is common to find decisions of public bodies and departments, and
decisions of tribunals relating to social insurance and social security
systems, that were reached by “medical” reports based only on the lack of
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“objective medical evidence,” or “scientific proof” of the affirmative.
Similar decisions can be found of arbitrators and some insurance
companies.31 The problem is most common when the physician is on the
staff of the adjudicating body, and is not instructed by a good lawyer. The
physician is then commonly the de facto decision-maker on questions of
law as well as medicine.
c) Availability and Relevance
Nowadays, “scientific proof” is commonly available for opinions on
diagnosis, but commonly unavailable for opinions on etiology.
In the courts, definitive “scientific proof” is seldom available to
resolve a medical issue. This is because when a medical question is one for
which definitive “scientific proof” is available, that question seldom
becomes an issue. “Scientific proof,” however, like statistics, may be
available for some components of an answer, and can then provide a basis
for estimating possibilities and probabilities relating to a larger medical
question. When no “scientific proof” at all is available, any “medical”
opinion that rests on nothing but the absence of “scientific proof” is
irrelevant, and a distraction.
Because claims for damages, workers’ compensation, military
pensions and benefits under some other systems provide for entitlement to
depend on etiology, they are bound to raise medical questions that lie
outside the capacity of medical science to answer. When a medical
specialist is retained to provide an opinion for a legal proceeding, the
specialist has usually been retained because the answer to a medical
question is difficult. It should be no surprise, therefore, that in legal
decision-making, it is commonly possible to reach a conclusion on a
medical issue only by drawing inferences from the circumstances.
d) Misuses of the Phrase
The bulk of cases in which “scientific proof” of the affirmative is
demanded, and a presumption of the negative is sought, are cases in which
“scientific proof” is unavailable. With regard to etiology in particular, any
requirement of “objective medical evidence” or “scientific proof” would
result in an escalating level of injustice. This is because of two continuing
trends.

31 See e.g. Lumsden v. Manitoba, 2007 MBQB 227, 219 Man.R. (2d) 97 in which
an insurance company was administering a “Long Term Disability Income Plan” of the
Government of Manitoba for its employees.
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· The continuous introduction of new chemicals, new chemical
compounds, and new uses of chemicals, as well as other
exposures, in industrial production and distribution, and into our
air, food and water.32 Research on etiology cannot keep pace with
this accelerating escalation of possible causes of disability and
death.
· The decline in government funding for independent medical
research, and the extension of patent protection for prescription
drugs. These financial shifts combine to increase the dependency
of research scholars on funding from the drug industry. This has
led to a shift in the resources of epidemiology from studies of
etiology to studies of treatment.
For this combination of reasons, the prospects of “scientific proof” being
available on a question of etiology are constantly declining. Some
additions are made every year to the known causes of disability and death,
but diseases of unknown etiology are most likely increasing at a faster
pace.
Two other related points are:
· Identification of the causative link. As part of a demand for
“scientific proof,” or independently, it is sometimes asserted or
assumed that causation cannot be found unless the causative
contaminant or circumstance is identified. That might be a
requirement for prevention or treatment, but it is not a
requirement of eligibility for compensation or damages.
· Diagnosis. It is sometimes asserted or assumed that a diagnosis is
required for any affirmative opinion on etiology. Commonly, the
medical profession will see a diagnosis as necessary for an
opinion on etiology, but in some cases the etiology of a disability
or death can be determined or inferred more readily than
diagnosis. Sometimes a presumptive schedule in a statute
requires a diagnosis for the presumption to apply, but where a
decision does not depend on such a presumptive schedule, there
is no legal requirement of a diagnosis as a prelude to a conclusion
on etiology.33

32

A large-scale current example is the development of nanotechnology.
See e.g. Re Workers’ Compensation Act and O’Donnell #2, 2007 YKSC 7, 155
A.C.W.S. (3d) 739 at para. 106.
33
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e) Explanations of the Demand for “Scientific Proof”
The demands for a presumption of the negative when there is no “scientific
proof” of the affirmative are used to prevent or rebut claims for damages
or compensation for disability or death as a result of employment
exposures, air or water pollution, the consumption of toxic food or drinks,
military service, or other causes. A demand for “scientific proof” of harm
has also been used repeatedly to justify government decisions to allow, and
to subsidize, the continuing rise in pollution and global warming. At least
in BC, this demand is also used to make cuts in the coverage of the health
care system.
Paradoxically, the demand of some interest groups, some physicians
and some administrators for “scientific proof” in legal decision-making,
and in other contexts, does not accord with normal medical practice. When
there is uncertainty on questions, such as diagnosis, etiology or prognosis,
it is normal routine for a physician to advise a patient of possibilities and
probabilities. The basis for any opinion given to a patient depends on the
circumstances, the question being addressed, and the expected use of the
opinion. Sometimes an opinion might be based on scientific proof, but
sometimes it might be based solely on unrecorded experience, anecdotal
evidence, the common knowledge of the profession, or special knowledge
from remembered or forgotten sources. Also, although physicians may not
express themselves in these terms, it is routine for physicians to advise
patients according to varying standards of proof (degrees of probability).
For example, if a patient’s problem might be one for which the appropriate
treatment would be a harmless exercise, the physician may think it
appropriate to assume the diagnosis on a low degree of probability, and
recommend the treatment. But if the appropriate treatment would be a
high-risk operation, the physician may well seek scientific proof (or other
proof close to a certainty) of diagnosis and prognosis, and perhaps make
other checks, before affirming the diagnosis and recommending the
treatment.
There are several explanations why a requirement is sometimes
asserted in social insurance and social security systems that for an
affirmative medical opinion to be admissible, it must be “objective,” or
based on “scientific proof,” even though no such requirement is assumed
for a negative opinion. One explanation is that decisions are commonly
made without the involvement of anyone qualified or trained to identify the
legally relevant medical questions. For example, this problem has plagued
workers’ compensation since our present systems began in Ontario in
1914, following the seminal Meredith Report. That report led to a great
improvement for employers, workers, and taxpayers; but unfortunately, the
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report did not recommend exactly how decisions should be made within
the Board. The structure and practice that emerged seemed to assume that
workers’ compensation decisions would only involve the determination of
simple facts, medical opinions, and arithmetic.
Regardless of whether that is a correct explanation, the only
professionals appointed to the claims departments of the boards were the
board doctors. In at least Ontario and BC, the boards established legal
departments, but the lawyers there generally dealt with such matters as
subrogation claims and the collection of assessments. They would only
occasionally become involved in a compensation claim. Because board
doctors were the only professionals in the claims departments, adjudicators
(usually promoted from clerical staff) would refer to them any question of
difficulty or uncertainty. A board doctor, who was supposed to be a medical
adviser, then became the de facto decision-maker on all questions,
including non-medical facts and law, as well as medicine. In particular,
board doctors decided, if only subconsciously, what was the legally
relevant medical question, without even recognizing that this was a
question of law. The problem was aggravated when, as commonly
happened, the opinion of a board doctor, who had never examined the
patient, became entrenched as the position of the board. Starting in the
1970s, the problem was solved or mitigated in some jurisdictions. The
extent to which it still prevails seems to vary with jurisdiction, time, level
of decision-making, and other factors.
In systems in which the “medical adviser” is the de facto decisionmaker on the general issue of entitlement, a decision may reflect restrictive
assumptions about the burden and standard of proof that accord with some
notion of science, or with budgeting, but not with the law of the system
being administered.
The problem can be aggravated, and sometimes created, by the
dependency of “independent medical experts.” The title “independent” is
usually adopted by, or attributed to, people who depend for most of their
incomes on being selected and continuously retained by a small number of
insurance companies, workers’ compensation boards (since the late
1980s), large business corporations, or some combination of these.
“Independent medical experts” commonly see a patient only once or twice,
often without having received a statement of the non-medical facts.
Treating specialists, on the other hand, usually depend for their incomes on
being selected by a large and ever-changing number of people, and they
commonly see a patient several times over a longer period. It is at least
arguable that they are more genuinely independent, though they never
seem to use that word in relation to themselves.

2008] Statistical Significance and the Distraction of “Scientific Proof”

147

In the adversary system, the reports of “independent medical experts”
usually seem at least responsive to the legally correct medical questions,
but that is commonly not so in the inquisitorial system. Unless instructed
otherwise, “independent medical experts” often report conclusions on the
general issue that involve erroneous assumptions of law, such as a
presumption of the negative, which they assume follows from the absence
of “scientific proof” of the affirmative.
Another explanation of the demand for “scientific proof” is that when
a statute is passed to benefit a dissipated public interest, it is common to
find that subsequent administration of the statute is under continuous
pressure or control from concentrated private interests.34 This can be
augmented by sociological phenomena, such as elite accommodation. In
the context of this article, it is concentrated private interests that benefit
from the demand for “scientific proof.”
There are also more benign explanations of the demands for “scientific
proof.” If a physician has not been properly instructed on the role of an
expert witness, there may be a misunderstanding about the expectations of
the adjudicating body. This can easily result from the diverse meanings of
“proof” and “proved.” Even in the same profession, these words are not
used with a consistent meaning. For example, during a trial a judge may
ask counsel whether something will be proved. The question usually
means “Will some evidence be adduced in support of that?” If, however, a
judge concludes in a judgment that a fact has been proved, this may mean
“I find the evidence in support of that fact more persuasive than the
evidence against it.” In the medical profession, to describe something as
“proved” might sometimes mean that it has been proved scientifically.
That is not a requirement in law, but a physician who has not been
otherwise informed might assume that it is.
f) The Aversion to “Don’t Know”
There seems to be a widespread and perhaps universal belief in the medical
profession that a medico-legal report should never conclude that “I don’t
know,” though if the author of the report does not know the answer to the
relevant question, that would seem the only correct conclusion to state. I
have read literally hundreds of “medical” reports, mostly in workers’
compensation cases, and mostly on questions of diagnosis or etiology, in
which a specialist clearly stated in an early paragraph of the report that he
or she does not know the answer - but I have never read a single report in
which any specialist or other physician ever concluded at the end of the
report that “I don’t know.” When a medical specialist consulted by the
34

This is part of the phenomenon known in the US as “regulatory capture.”
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adjudicating body has stated early in the report that he or she does not
know the answer, a common practice is to presume the negative, and
conclude that the disability or death did not result from employment.
For courts or other tribunals using the adversary system, the practice
of concluding a medico-legal report with an answer one way or the other
is understandable. The lawyer for each party will only seek, or only put in
evidence, the report of a physician whose opinion favours that party. It is
another matter when an adjudicating body operates on an inquisitorial
model, and the reporting physician is employed or retained by the
adjudicating body. In those reports, there should be no aversion to
concluding that “I don’t know” if that would be the correct answer. It is in
exactly this context, however, that I have read hundreds of medical reports
saying “I don’t know” in the opening paragraphs, while none concludes
with that statement. It is also rare for the intervening paragraphs of these
reports to show any logical reason for the movement from “don’t know” to
a conclusion one way.
It can help if a report includes any thoughts on possibilities and
probabilities, but concluding with a presumption instead of “I don’t know”
simply distracts the adjudicator from reaching a legally correct conclusion.
It can also help if, as well as concluding that “I don’t know,” the reporting
specialist can say whether an answer is likely to be obtainable from another
source, or the question lies outside the scope of medical science to answer.
Sometimes, the aversion to concluding that “I don’t know” may
explain the use statistics of unknown validity, or why a medical report ends
with a presumption of the negative for no reason except the absence of
“scientific proof” of the affirmative.
g) The Legal Significance of “Scientific Proof”
Unless the statute law of a system provides otherwise, there is no
requirement of any particular type of proof of causation. When an
affirmative medical opinion has been rejected because it lacks “scientific
proof” or “objective medical evidence,” this usually means that the
consequential decision was wrong in law.
It is also noteworthy that the inquisitorial system is the same as the
adversary system with regard to the standard of proof, but it differs with
regard to the burden of proof. If the evidence for and against a claim is
adjudged to be evenly balanced, the adversary system then applies a legal
presumption of the negative, because the burden of proof lies on the
plaintiff. In the inquisitorial system, the parties are usually required to
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provide all relevant information available to them; but for resolving any
remaining uncertainties, the burden lies on the adjudicating body to initiate
and conduct further enquiries. Advocacy, including the provision of further
evidence and argument, is a supplementary option. If, after making such
further enquiries as the adjudicating body deems appropriate, the evidence
for and against a claim is judged to be about evenly balanced, some
systems provide that the claimant be given the benefit of the doubt. This is
specified in some workers’ compensation statutes. Some others provide
that “all reasonable inferences” be drawn in favour of the worker, and this
phrase is commonly interpreted to mean that the worker (or dependants) be
given the benefit of the doubt. A similar phrase appears in the legislation
of some other systems, such as military pensions, and it might be argued
that it is open to the same interpretation.
A related distinction is that under the adversary system, the issues
decided are usually drawn from among those raised by the parties. Under
the inquisitorial system, the adjudicating body commonly initiates as well
decides the issues, the more so when there is only one participating party.
The legal position is that when etiology is unknown, the court or other
adjudicating body must reach a conclusion as best it can on the balance of
probabilities (the best available hypothesis).35 Often, however, that has not
been explained in advance to the advising physician. A workers’
compensation case within my own experience involved a claim by the
widow of a former miner who had died of a respiratory disease. The issue
was whether his death had resulted from twenty-five years of exposure to
mining dusts. The Board had retained a panel of three specialists in lung
diseases to provide an opinion. Because the panellists had been instructed
by a Board doctor, their instructions did not identify the legally relevant
questions.36 In an early paragraph, the unanimous report of the panel stated
the diagnosis as “chronic obstructive lung disease,” which they said could
have been caused by the twenty-five years of exposure to mining dusts. At
35

The phrase “best available hypothesis” was suggested to me by the Dean of
Medicine at UBC in 1975 as a synonym for the balance of probabilities, and one that might
be more understandable in the medical profession.
36 One way of putting those questions might be:
a) Is it possible that the exposure of the worker over 25 years to mining dusts was
a significant contributing cause of the disease that led to his death?
b) If the answer to a) is affirmative, can you identify any other exposure or
circumstance that might have been a significant contributing cause?
c) If the answers to a) and b) are both affirmative, is it likely or unlikely that the
exposure of the worker to the mining dusts was one of the significant
contributing causes of the disease that led to the death; or are the probabilities
of this being so about evenly balanced?
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the end, the report concluded: “There is no evidence that the death was
caused by employment.” Whatever the panel understood by “evidence,”
the conclusion left the Board to determine etiology as best it could. The
specialists had reported that employment causation was a credible
hypothesis. No evidence could be found to identify any non-employment
exposure that might have been causative. Therefore the claim was allowed.
Keeping medical experts focussed on the legally relevant medical
questions is less of a problem in courts than in other adjudicating bodies
because the courts have traditionally held oral hearings in primary
adjudication, though nowadays a medical report might be admitted at trial
without the presence of the physician, at least if there is no objection.
Often, the medical expert has also discussed the opinion with the lawyer
for at least one of the parties. Many other adjudicating bodies never hold
oral enquires, at least not in primary adjudication. Some are also reluctant
to hold an oral enquiry at any level of appeal, or if they hold one are
reluctant to have the medical expert present whose opinion was relied upon
in primary adjudication. On a complex medical issue, however, it can be
hard to formulate in writing the legally relevant medical questions, and to
ensure that the questions were understood by the reader to have the
meaning intended by the writer. That problem can usually be avoided if
final communications with the medical specialist are oral and interactive.
The demeanour of the witness and the answers given can help to ensure
that the questions were properly understood, as well as helping to weigh
the evidence. Oral interaction also allows a specialist to ask for
clarification of a question. It allows follow-up questions to be asked, and
any cross-examination.37 Oral hearings are only needed in a very small
proportion of social insurance or social security cases, but when they are
needed, the need does not arise for the first time at some stage of appeal.
The need is at its greatest in primary adjudication.
Where a statutory presumption of the affirmative applies, any
“medical” report based on nothing but a presumption of the negative is
even more objectionable, and even more clearly inadmissible. For
example, many workers’ compensation statutes include a schedule of
occupational diseases. The schedule is in two columns, one a list of
37

In Melanson v. New Brunswick (Workers’ Compensation Board) (1994), 146
N.B.R. (2d) 294 at 306-08, 114 DLR (4th) 75 (N.B.C.A.), the Court decided that if a written
medical report of an outside specialist engaged by the board or the appellate body, or of a
board doctor, was to be considered on appeal, the author of the report must be produced as
a witness for cross-examination by a party. It is arguable, however, that at least in workers’
compensation proceedings, cross-examination should only be allowed if it is conducted in
a manner, tone and language that shows respect for the witness, with the avoidance of scorn,
smirking, or language that is aggressive or insulting.

2008] Statistical Significance and the Distraction of “Scientific Proof”

151

diseases, and the other a list of industries or exposures. Each entry in the
first column is opposite an entry in the second column. A section of the
statute provides that where a worker sustained a disease mentioned in the
first column, and had been employed in the circumstances mentioned
opposite that disease in the second column, the disease is presumed to
have resulted from the employment, unless the contrary is proved. Yet in
at least three jurisdictions, it has been known for a claim to be denied
because the contrary has been “proved” by a medical opinion that rested
on nothing but a presumption of the negative in the absence of “scientific
proof” of the affirmative. By adopting such a “medical” opinion, the
board in these cases applied a presumption of the negative when the
statute expressly required a presumption of the affirmative.
In an inquisitorial system, where there is no burden of proof on
a party, a conclusion must be reached regardless of whether there is a
firm basis for a conclusion either way. In some cases, it may only be
possible to reach a conclusion by intelligent guesswork, usually
described as drawing reasonable inferences from the circumstances.
Even in civil actions in the courts, where there is a burden of proof on
the plaintiff, it is still recognized that if the parties have adduced all the
available evidence, and there is no firm basis for a conclusion, a decision
should be reached by drawing a reasonable inference from the
circumstances.
Whatever the historical explanation for reaching conclusions in this
way, it is clearly justified by the injustice that would flow from applying
a presumption of the negative in the absence of “scientific proof” of the
affirmative. If an erroneous negative decision is made, a human being
suffers financially, and bears the cost of industrial, military or motorvehicle activity. Commonly, the individual will also suffer in health,
family relations, and other consequences of poverty. If an affirmative
decision is erroneous, the loss is usually born by an aggregated fund,
such as tax revenue, an insurer, or a major corporation, and no adverse
consequences are suffered in health or family relations. The traditional
legal theory was that insurance or another source of funding to pay a
claim is irrelevant, but that has never been the position in practice,38
and even the theory is eroding.39
Even with no presumption of the negative in the absence of “scientific
proof,” the scales of justice already weigh heavily in favour of those who
38

Insurance coverage is, for example, one explanation why it is much easier for a
pedestrian to succeed in an action against a motor-vehicle driver than it is for a driver to
succeed in an action against a pedestrian.
39 See e.g. Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 SCR 534, at 554, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 45.
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would benefit from such a presumption. For several reasons, many and
probably most valid claims are never pursued, particularly if pursuing a
claim would involve the cost,40 stress, long delays and uncertainties of the
adversary system. Applying a presumption of the negative would tip the
scales of justice even further. This is even more so in cases of disability or
death from disease. It is very likely that with regard to claims for damages,
workers’ compensation, and military pensions, the claims pursued in
disease cases are only a tiny portion of the claims that would succeed if the
research on etiology had been done. There is no standard routine for a
patient with a disease to be asked for an exposure history to produce data
on possible causes, and a patient might never even think about whether the
evidence to support a claim could be available. With regard to cancer, for
example, there is no standard admission form at places of treatment
seeking data on any broad range of exposures that might have been
causative, though a question on smoking history is common.
The available statistics relating to cancer also illustrate the point. Over
the years, there have been enough epidemiological studies to estimate that
occupational exposures cause, or at least are a significant contributing
cause, of somewhere in the range of 20 percent to 50 percent of all cancers.
Yet the number of workers’ compensation claims for cancer is tiny. A
similar impression appears with regard to environmental exposures. There
are surely a substantial number of cancers from environmental exposures
and for which the offending industry could be identified. Yet a claim for
damages for nuisance or negligence in such circumstances is unusual.
These examples illustrate that to require “scientific proof” of the
affirmative before a claim is allowed would add to what is already a
negative tip in the scales of injustice.
Another public policy objection to any requirement of “scientific proof”
is that it would further impair the efficiency of a market economy, including
fair competition and the optimum allocation of resources. In traditional
economic theory, the benefits of a market economy can only be achieved if
the externalization of costs is controlled, and every product bears the cost of
its own production. This provides an assurance, or at least a hope, that the
choices made by consumers will generally represent the public interest. Thus
when our present workers’ compensation systems began in Ontario in 1914,
one of the goals was to internalize the costs of industrial activity, and prevent
those costs from being passed on to taxpayers through welfare or in other
ways.41 With regard to actions for damages, they are not an efficient way of

40

In most jurisdictions nowadays, lawyers are allowed to act for contingent
percentage fees, but they will only do so in a limited range of cases.
41 See Meredith Report, supra note 29 at 4, 16; Commissioner Meredith (then Chief
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internalizing costs; but when it is feasible for plaintiffs to discharge the
burden of proof, such actions can help.
There are some situations, however, in which a lack of “scientific
proof” can be relevant in adjudication. One is when there are two
admissible medical opinions, one supported by “scientific proof” and a
contrary opinion that is not. “Scientific proof” is then a consideration in
deciding which opinion is the more cogent.
It can also be relevant whether “objective medical evidence” or
“scientific proof” is normally available on the particular issue, and in the
circumstances of the case. If it is, and the case is being decided on the
adversary system, a failure to adduce such evidence could warrant some
questions. When no such evidence is normally available, to deny a claim
because no such evidence was adduced in the particular case would
displace the obligation to decide according to the balance of probabilities
(the best available hypothesis) on the best evidence available, and replace
it with a presumption of the negative for no reason except the absence of
“scientific proof.”
Problems of “scientific proof” are confused and compounded if the
only “scientific proof” available, for the affirmative or the negative, relies
on statistics that are not statistically significant in the broader meaning of
that term.
When a medical opinion refers to a research project, it is sometimes
argued in court that the research report should be weighed by considering
peer reviews. Of course, peer review can be a useful form of quality
control; but it can also have its limitations. One is that the standard of proof
used by a reviewer in judging an article or report may be different from the
standard of proof that is relevant in adjudication. Peer reviews can also be
a way of suppressing or downgrading independent articles that do not
accord with the dominant ideology of the time. There can also be some
peer discomfort if an article breaks new ground, disturbing what had been
common assumptions in the profession. Conflicts of interest can also be an
influence. For example, if an independent research project shows that
previously unknown adverse affects are caused by a drug, or by industrial
pollution, critical reviews might be expected from some of those who
depend financially on the affected industry. Where research for an article
Justice of Ontario) referred to preventing the cost of occupational disabilities and deaths
from falling onto “the community.” This public policy objective is also reflected in the
some of the workers’ compensation legislation in provisions to reimburse the welfare
department out of the compensation payable for any welfare payments that a worker has
received since the injury.
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was funded, the source of that funding might sometimes be considered
more significant than peer reviews. For these reasons, peer reviews should
be read cautiously when weighing the output of any research, particularly
when high profits are involved.
h) The Position of the Courts
The courts have commonly reacted with common sense to any assertion or
assumption that an affirmative conclusion requires “scientific proof”
or “objective medical evidence.” There are some basic requirements
for any opinion evidence to be admissible. The witness must be
qualified to express the opinion. The opinion must be relevant to an
issue in the proceeding. The facts on which the opinion is based
must generally be within the first-hand knowledge of the witness, or
within the expertise of the witness to determine, or be proved by
the evidence of another witness who has first-hand knowledge of those
facts. For example, if a medical opinion rests, in part, on symptoms
described by the patient to the medical witness, and which the witness
cannot otherwise verify, the symptoms must generally be proved by the
evidence of the patient, or another witness having first-hand knowledge of
the symptoms.
As long as the basic requirements for admissibility have been met,
any medical opinion is acceptable as expert evidence, regardless
of whether it is “objective” or based on “scientific proof.” The quality
or strength of an opinion goes to its weight, not to its admissibility.
The conclusions of a medical opinion will also be found by the
court to have been proved, regardless of “scientific proof,” unless the judge
regards those conclusions as lacking any credibility, or they are
contradicted by other medical opinion that is judged to have greater
weight.
As early as 1774, Lord Mansfield stated that “... all evidence is to be
weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to
have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted.”42 That
statement was cited with approval in the unanimous decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Farrell v, Snell in 1990.43 The Court also
quoted with approval from earlier judgments of other courts. In Wilsher v.
Essex Area Health Authority,44 the earlier House of Lords decision in

42
43
44

ibid.

Blatch v. Archer (1774), 1 Cowp. 63 at 65, 98 E.R. 969 at 970.
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at 328, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 289 [Farrell cited to S.C.R.].
[1988] 2 W.L.R. 557 (H.L.), rev’g [1987] 2 W.L.R. 425 (C.A.) [Wilsher] cited in
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McGhee v. National Coal Board45 was explained as “promoting a robust
and pragmatic approach to the facts to enable an inference of negligence to
be drawn even though medical or scientific expertise cannot arrive at a
definitive conclusion.” The Supreme Court in Farrell noted that “...
although the doctors cannot identify the process of causation scientifically,
there seems to be nothing irrational in drawing the inference, as a matter
of common sense, that the consecutive periods when brick dust remained
on the body contributed cumulatively to the causation of the dermatitis.”46
The Court also reaffirmed in Farrell that “[c]ausation need not be
determined by scientific precision”47 and that “[t]he legal or ultimate
burden remains with the plaintiff, but in the absence of evidence to the
contrary adduced by the defendant, an inference of causation may be
drawn although positive or scientific proof of causation has not been
adduced.”48 Even if no medical opinion at all is in evidence, an inference
of causation may be drawn. With respect to the lower court decision in
Farrell, the Court concluded that “...[the trial judge] failed to appreciate
that it is not essential to have a positive medical opinion to support a
finding of causation. Furthermore, it is not speculation but the application
of common sense to draw such an inference where, as here, the
circumstances, other than positive medical opinion, permit.”49
These principles evolved in the common law courts for claims decided
on the adversary system, with a burden of proof on the plaintiff. A fortiori,
a medical opinion is not required to be “objective,” or supported by
“scientific proof,” to be admissible in a system established to be
inquisitorial,50 and thereby to relieve a disabled person or dependant of any
burden of proof. It would be particularly objectionable to introduce such a
requirement in a system, such as workers’ compensation, where one
rationale for our present system was to make the admissibility of evidence
less restrictive (not more restrictive) than in the courts.
45

[1973] 1 W.L.R. 1 (H.L.) [McGhee] cited in ibid.
Supra note 43 at 325 (citing the passage in Wilsher explaining McGhee).
47 Ibid. at 328.
48 Ibid. at 330.
49 Ibid. at 336.
50 The standard provision in workers’ compensation legislation that the Board shall
“enquire into” a claim, as well as “hear and determine” has always been interpreted to mean
that the system is inquisitorial. The worker and the employer have statutory duties to report
to the Board facts within their knowledge, and the attending physician has a statutory duty
to report facts and opinion. Standard forms are used for these purposes. But when these
reports are not enough to reach a conclusion, the boards undertake enquiries to obtain such
further evidence as may be required. Arguments on law are also raised by staff or members
of a board, though they may also be received from the parties.
46
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There have also been court decisions confirming that these principles
apply to social security and social insurance systems as well as actions for
damages. The courts have taken this view whether the case comes to court
by appeal (where there is a statutory right of appeal) or on judicial review.
For example, with regard to pensions for disability or death from military
service, there have been many tribunal decisions denying claims on the
ground that affirmative medical evidence was not supported by “scientific
proof”; and those decisions have been set aside by the courts. In Thériault
v. Canada (A.G.),51 for example, the Veterans Review and Appeal Board
had rejected an affirmative medical opinion “...primarily because the
Board had no knowledge of a higher rate of vascular illness or ‘popliteal
entrapment’ among young members of the military than in the general
population. The Board also added that the record should have contained
studies or statistics to establish such a rate.”52
In other words, the Board had decided that the lack of any relevant
epidemiological research warranted a presumption of the negative.
Understandably, the Federal Court set aside that decision because “[t]he
Board appeared to require a much higher standard of proof than that of the
balance of probabilities.”53
Contemporary reports54 and case files show that the practice of
presuming the negative in the absence of “scientific proof” of the
affirmative continues, notwithstanding clarification of its illegality by the
courts, and by some of the boards and tribunals.55
Similar problems can arise in the medical care coverage of workers’
compensation systems, provincial health care plans, and other government
programs. If the coverage of diagnostic testing or treatment is made to
depend on “scientific proof” that the test or the treatment is beneficial,
there will be an increasing lack of coverage for beneficial tests and
treatments.

51

2006 FC 1070, 299 F.T.R. 246, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 352 (F.C.).
Ibid. at para. 50.
53 Ibid. at para. 51.
54 See e.g. Northwest Territories, Legislative Assembly, Minutes of the Standing
Committee on Accountability and Oversight, 15th Leg. 5th sess. (29 June 2006) at 63
(evidence of Colin Baile).
55 See e.g. Manitoba, Workers Compensation Board, The Workers Compensation
Act: Legislative Overview 2006, (WCB Backgrounder) (Winnipeg: Program Development
and Review, 2006) at 14, online: The Workers Compensation Board of Manitoba
<http://www.wcb.mb.ca/download/about_wcb/WCABackgrounder2006.pdf>.
52
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4. Wanting to Decide the General Issue
This heading further explains why a presumption of the negative is
commonly adopted in the absence of “scientific proof.” It also explains
why adjudicative decisions often involve other illegalities. Medical experts
who frequently provide opinions to courts usually understand that their
role is to express an opinion on medical questions, and nothing else. Many
other medical specialists dislike confining their roles to medical advice.
They commonly want to decide the general issue, including questions of
law, and moral or political questions, as well as medical questions. There
are several possible explanations.
a) Medical Education
The phenomenon might begin with the scope of medical education. In
legal education, a course on Jurisprudence usually includes a discourse on
the nature of law. Other courses, such as Evidence, involve distinguishing
questions of law from questions of fact, and which among the facts can
usually be determined best with the help of an expert opinion. The
corresponding distinctions do not seem to be a part of medical education.
Obviously a focus on medical science is in the public interest; but that
focus can also limit the perspective. The breadth of a physician’s role, and
any preference between advisory or decision-making functions, are more
likely to result from individual personality than from medical education.
b) Career Experience
The educational differences are reinforced by subsequent career
experience. It is routine for practising lawyers to distinguish questions of
law from questions of fact; and among the latter, to distinguish issues that
can benefit from expert advice (known as “opinion evidence”). In medical
practice, some patients want a medical opinion so that they can make a
better informed decision about what to do; but physicians are constantly
dealing with people who do not want an exclusive focus on medical
advice. Many, perhaps most, patients simply want to be told “what I should
do.” Even if a rational decision would require a compromise of medical
advice with economic, social or other goals, many patients still want a
physician to decide for them what to do. There are also the emergency
situations involving an unconscious patient, and no-one else available who
is authorized to consent to treatment. Necessity may sometimes require a
surgeon or other physician to be the decision-maker, even if there are
treatment options, and even if the choice among them may have economic
and social consequences.
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c) Absence of Lawyers
Many adjudicating bodies do not employ lawyers in primary adjudication,
and some do not even employ lawyers for appeals; but they may have
physicians on staff who play an active role in primary adjudication, as well
as on appeals. If the adjudicator is a person with no professional status, and
particularly if the adjudicator has been promoted by seniority from clerical
staff, the physician may be the only professional person readily to hand. A
file may be reviewed by the staff physician because it includes a difficult
question, not necessarily a medical question, and the adjudicator may feel
bound to defer to the physician. The staff physician then becomes the de
facto decision-maker on the general issue of entitlement, including
questions of law, non-medical fact, and any moral or political questions.
When this happens, the assumptions of law are commonly wrong. For
example, some staff physicians reach a negative conclusion for no reason
except that the medical evidence of the affirmative is not “objective” or not
supported by “scientific proof.” Staff physicians (and “independent
medical experts”) also sometimes assume or assert that the eligible cause
must be the exclusive cause of the disability or death, not recognising that
the law requires only that the eligible cause be a significant – more than de
minimis – contributing cause of the disability or death for which
entitlement is claimed.56
This propensity among staff physicians of adjudicating bodies to want
to decide the general issue sometimes spills over to external specialists
retained to advise in a particular case. They sometimes also want to decide
the general issue. A vivid example within my own experience was a
56

See e.g. Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 SCR 458 at 466, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 235 which
reaffirms this principle in the context of actions for damages. A unanimous Supreme Court
of Canada said that “…a defendant is liable for any injuries caused or contributed to by his
or her negligence… the presence of other non-tortious contributing causes does not reduce
the extent of the defendant’s liability. Loss cannot be apportioned according to the degree
of causation where it is created by tortious and non-tortious causes” [emphasis added in
published headnote]. See also Decision No. 1508/04 (2005), 74 W.S.I.A.T.R. 101 at 113-14
( the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal reaffirmed this principle in the context of
workers’ compensation); Ferneyhough v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Tribunal), 2000 NSCA 121, 189 N.S.R. (2d) 76 at 81-82 (the Court reaffirmed that the
compensable accident need only be a significant contributing cause of the disability or
death for which benefits are claimed. It does not need to be a substantial contributing cause.
The Court also reaffirmed that “significant” means only more than de minimis); see also
Saskatchewan Government Insurance v. Steinhauer, 2006 SKCA 1, 275 Sask. R. 59 (the
same principle applied to accident benefits under motor vehicle insurance).
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workers’ compensation case in which the worker had a compensable
accident causing a violent shake of her head. A few weeks later, she was
diagnosed with a detached retina. At the final level of appeal, the Board
retained an ophthalmologist to meet with the Commissioners. At the
meeting, the facts of the case were stated orally to the ophthalmologist, and
several questions asked. The final question was what the ophthalmologist
thought were the probabilities that the accident was a significant
contributing cause of the retinal detachment that became noticeable a few
weeks later. He answered that he thought the probabilities of this being so,
or not so, were about even. The ophthalmologist was then thanked for his
opinion and shown to the door, but he was reluctant to leave; as if he felt
that he had not completed his role. After the door was closed behind him,
he reopened it enough to put his head around and said “I would pay her
fifty per cent.”
5. Conclusion
In the course of a long career, I have read literally hundreds of medical
opinions that were provided in the context of controversy or uncertainty
about legal entitlement. Almost by definition, the controversial medical
questions are those for which no “scientific proof” is available. The most
superficial and the most commonly irrelevant “medical” opinions that I
have read have been those that rely on statistics of unknown validity, or on
the lack of “scientific proof.” The most thoughtful and deeply analytical
medical opinions that I have read, the most cogent, and commonly the only
ones that are legally relevant, are the opinions that made little or no
mention of “scientific proof,” or of statistics. This article might help to
explain why that would be so.

